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I compare the behavior of job creation and job destruction over the past two economic downturns.  
Both periods have brief but sharp rises in job destruction followed by flat net job growth.  The 
dynamics underlying these slow recoveries differ drastically.  In 1991-92, job destruction is slow 
to decline.  In 2001, job creation falls dramatically and remains persistently low through 2003.  I 
find this trend qualitatively similar in both manufacturing and service industries.  I also find that 
neither a structural shift of jobs across industries nor increased trade liberalization is a consistent 
explanation for the recent lack of growth.  Instead, the evidence suggests that a large drop in 












The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official 
positions or policies of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics or the views of other staff members.  1  
Introduction 
  Although the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) identified the last 
recession as ending in November 2001, the private sector has lost an additional 1.1 million jobs 
through June 2003.  This job loss occurred despite increases in GDP and labor productivity.  
Weak job growth also followed the business cycle trough of March 1991.  At that time, job 
growth did not pick up until the latter part of 1992, just as the longest expansion on record began. 
  In this paper, I compare the patterns of job creation and job destruction underlying the 
last two recessions and their slow employment recoveries.  I define job creation as the gross 
number of jobs gained at establishments either opening up or expanding their workforce, and 
similarly define job destruction as the gross number of jobs lost at establishments either closing 
down or contracting their workforce.  I use longitudinal data from the Business Employment 
Dynamics (BED) program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  The data include all 
employees covered under state unemployment insurance programs.  The BLS has these estimates 
publicly available for the private sector for mid-1992 through mid-2003.  Data issues, 
unfortunately, make the release of earlier data by the BLS currently infeasible.  To counter these 
issues, I manually go through the pre-1992 data and create algorithms to deal with these issues.  
Consequently, I have a time-series of gross job flows that dates back to early 1990 and forward to 
2003, allowing a previously impossible comparison of employment dynamics during the last two 
economic downturns. 
  I find that while the net employment changes over the past two recessions are similar, 
their underlying dynamics are quite different.  In 1991, job destruction peaks as the recession 
reaches it height.  Job creation changes little during this time.  During the stagnant period that 
follows, job creation again changes little, but the pace of job destruction is slow to decline, 
leading to the small observed net gains.  In 2001, job destruction again peaks as the recession 
reaches its height.  This time, however, there is a dramatic drop in job creation.  The pace of job 
creation continues to fall well into the recovery period.  Even though job destruction returns to its  2  
expansion-period pace relatively quickly, net losses in jobs persist because of the exceptionally 
low rate of job creation that continues well into 2003.  A comparison of major industry sectors 
shows these trends to be qualitatively similar in both manufacturing and services. 
  In addition, my job flow analysis suggests that structural factors do not account for the 
drop-off in job creation that persists through the 2002-03 period.  I compare the highest and 
lowest-growing industries of the expansion period.  I find no major shifts in their trend patterns of 
either job creation or job destruction during or after the recent recession.  If anything, there is an 
increase in trend job destruction among the expanding industries, which may be reflective of an 
employment bubble bursting.  I also compare manufacturing industries of differing degrees of 
sensitivity to international trade.  I find that industries who tend to gain from trade suffered just as 
much as, if not more than (from an employment perspective), those who are most sensitive to 
strong imports.   
  The next section details the data and defines the relevant job flow concepts.  After that, I 
present the basic evidence on job flows between 1990 and 2003.  The following section analyzes 
whether either structural changes or changes in trade patterns contributed to the recent 
employment downturn.  I then discuss the recent decline in job creation in more detail.  The final 
section discusses my findings and draws conclusions. 
 
Data and Definitions 
  The data come from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), or ES-
202, program.  The BED data are a longitudinal version of the QCEW data, used for quarterly 
estimates of gross job gains (also referred to as job creation) and gross job losses (also referred to 
as job destruction).  The BED data are a virtual census of employment, which includes all 
establishments covered under state unemployment insurance programs.
1  The BED links 
establishment records over time, providing a longitudinal employment history for each.  Record 
                                                 
1 The government, self-employed, and private households are the primary exclusions from the BED.  3  
linkage is a detailed process, and it is summarized well in Pivetz, Searson, and Spletzer (2001) 
and Clayton et al. (2004).  The longitudinal nature of the data allows the BLS to estimate the 
number of jobs gained or lost by establishments each quarter.  These estimates are currently 
available from the third quarter of 1992 through the second quarter of 2003.  The BED data, 
however, goes back to 1990.  Major changes to the QCEW program prior to 1992 make it 
difficult for the BLS to produce estimates that meet official publication standards for this period.  
Researchers, however, can access the microdata and produce their own estimates for the 1990-92 
period.   
  My data encompass quarterly employment and job flow estimates for all private sector 
establishments between March 1990 and June 2003.  I obtain job flow estimates for the earlier 
period by using my own linkage algorithm as a supplement to the current BLS methodologies.  
My technique appeals to the fact that the linkage difficulties stem from the implementation of a 
specific administrative change (the implementation of the “Multiple Worksite Report”).  The 
nature of the change does not allow a straightforward linkage of some continuous records, and 
thus creates an overstatement of job creation and destruction.  With several identifying 
assumptions, however, I am able to virtually eliminate this overstatement.  In the appendix, I 
detail the nature of the administrative change and my methods for dealing with it. 
  For this study, I use the standard BLS definitions of gross job gains and losses as my 
definitions of job creation and job destruction.  I measure changes in employment as those 
between the third month of employment for each quarter.  I define job creation as the sum of all 
employment gains at (i) continuous establishments expanding their employment from some 
positive level, and (ii) “opening” establishments reporting either positive employment for the first 
time or after reporting zero employment in the previous quarter.  I define job destruction as the 
sum of all employment losses at (i) continuous establishments contracting their employment to a 
level that is still greater than zero, and (ii) “closing” establishments either disappearing or  4  
reporting zero employment after reporting positive employment in the previous quarter.
2  The 
more familiar net change in employment is simply the difference between all jobs created and all 
jobs destroyed.  Where reported, job flow and net change rates are the percentages of the third-
month employment average of the current and previous quarters.
3 
   Finally, I report estimates seasonally adjusted using the X-12 ARIMA process.  I do so 
separately for the expanding, opening, contracting, and closing establishments at the 3-digit level 
of the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).  The industry detail is 
comparable to the 2-digit level of the older SIC system.  Reported aggregated estimates are sums 
of these seasonally adjusted series.  For the third quarter of 1992 forward, my seasonally 
unadjusted data are essentially identical to the published BED data.  Due to differing adjustment 
methodologies, the seasonally adjusted series are slightly different.  Overall, the data cover 5.0 
million establishments representing 89.3 million employees in March 1990 and 6.4 million 
establishments representing 107.6 employees in June 2003.  On average, establishment 
expansions and contractions make up about 80 percent of quarterly job creation and destruction, 
respectively. 
 
Employment and Job Flows, 1990-2003 
  The period from March 1990 through June 2003 contains a prolonged expansion 
sandwiched between two economic downturns.  Based on the dating of the NBER, the first 
downturn begins after a business cycle peak in the third quarter of 1990, reaching its trough in the 
first quarter of 1991.  Relative to previous recessions, employment losses are mild, but 
employment gains during the recovery are slow to materialize (see Figure 1).  The second 
downturn begins as the economy peaks in the first quarter of 2001.  Figure 1 illustrates that 
employment losses (from the business cycle peak) are sharper relative to previous recessions by 
                                                 
2 Given my definitions, openings and closings include re-openings and temporary closing, as well as births 
and deaths. 
3 Rate calculation follows the methodology of both the BLS and Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996).  5  
the time a trough is reached in the fourth quarter of the same year.  In addition, employment 
losses continue during the recovery, through the second quarter of 2003, the latest available data.   
Figure 1. 
































































Notes: Figure uses the Current Employment Statistics of the BLS.  The previous six recessions span 1953 
through 1982, and count the double-dip of 1980-82 as a single event.  Recent business cycle troughs are 
noted in parentheses. 
 
  Unlike previous downturns, the two most recent recessions have prolonged jobless spells 
during their subsequent recoveries.  Based on the net employment changes over these two 
periods, one could conclude that there are many similarities in the behavior of the labor market 
over these two periods.  The job flows underlying these net changes, however, show that the two 
recessions and their subsequent recoveries are quite different.  Figure 2 shows the quarterly rates 
of job creation and job destruction from the second quarter of 1990 though the second quarter of 
2003.  Remember that the net employment change in a given quarter is the difference between the 
job creation rate and the job destruction rate.  The NBER-dated peaks and troughs are outlined.  
Both recessions have relatively high rates of job destruction, with large spikes of job loss at or 
near each trough.  The spike in job destruction in the first quarter of 1991 is particularly large, 
encompassing 9.5 percent of employment.  The spike in job destruction in 2001 is not as great  6  
(8.2 percent of employment), but persists at this rate over three quarters.  The job destruction rate 
declines in both recovery periods, but does so much slower in the earlier recovery.  After the 
1991 trough, the pace of job loss does not reach a rate of 7.5 percent (its average rate during the 
subsequent expansion) until the end of 1992.  Following the 2001 trough, the job destruction rate 
is 7.5 percent after only two quarters, and continues to fall thereafter.  Job creation is markedly 
different during the two recessions and recoveries.  Between 1990 and 1992, the job creation rate 
diverges little from 8.2 percent of employment, which is also its average during the subsequent 
expansion.  The pace of job creation peaks at 8.4 percent by the end of 1999.  By the end of 2000, 
the job creation rate is 7.8 percent.  As the business cycle peaks, the job creation rate continues to 
decline, reaching a low of 7.2 percent in the third quarter of 2001.  Job creation picks up 
somewhat after the trough, rising back to 7.5 percent by the first quarter of 2002, but its pace 
begins another steep decline, this time to 7.0 percent, by the first quarter of 2003.  Its rate in the 

















































































































































































Notes: Estimates are based on author’s calculations from the BED data of the BLS.  See text for details. 
  7  
  Thus, while the past two recessions and subsequent recoveries seem quite similar on the 
surface, they are starkly different in their underlying dynamics.  In particular, the pace of job 
creation between 2001 and 2003 is well below its historical norm, and accounts for the lack of job 
growth that occurs following the business cycle trough.  In contrast, the flat job growth that 
follows the 1991 trough stems from a relatively slow decline in the pace of job losses, rather than 
any drop-off in job creation.  Figure 3 illustrates the differences best by depicting job flows 
during the two recessions as a percentage of their level at each business cycle peak.  In relative 
terms, the 1990-91 recession has a distinct episode of job loss that remains persistently higher 
long after the trough, while the 2001 recession has a substantial decline in job creation that 
continues well into the recovery period. 
Figure 3. 


































































Notes: Estimates are based on author’s calculations from the BED data of the BLS.  Job flows are 
measured relative to their levels at the relevant NBER-dated business cycle peak. 
  8  
Industry Comparisons 
  Job losses in the past two downturns occur disproportionately in manufacturing, as Table 
1 illustrates.  In both periods, manufacturing loses a considerable amount of jobs even as the other 
industries begin a recovery.  It is important to see whether manufacturing job flows behave 
differently than other industries.  I present a broad comparison of the manufacturing sector to a 
grouping of service, financial and information sectors, based on the NAICS industry coding.
4  I 
replicate Figure 2 with estimates for manufacturing (Figure 4) and services, finance, and 
information (Figure 5.) 
Table 1. Net Changes in Employment (Thousands of Jobs), 1990-1992 and 2001-2003 
  June 1990 to March 1991  March 1991 to September 1992 
Manufacturing -834  -343 
Non-manufacturing -1,026  +446 
Total Private Sector  -1,860  +103 
  March 2001 to December 2001  December 2001to June 2003 
Manufacturing -1,218  -1,224 
Non-manufacturing -1,520  +121 
Total Private Sector  -2,738  -1,103 
Notes: Estimates are based on author’s calculations from the BED data  of the BLS.   
 
  The first thing to note from Figure 4 is that job reallocation in manufacturing is 
considerably lower than in the rest of the private sector.  For instance, job creation averages just 
5.0 percent of manufacturing employment between 1993 and 2000, while job destruction 
averages just 4.9 percent.  This compares with average private-sector rates of 8.2 and 7.5 percent, 
respectively.  Manufacturing job flows have several notable differences and similarities with the 
private-sector job flows.  Despite the differences in magnitude, the patterns of job destruction are 
generally similar, particularly during the two recessions, but there are some distinctions.  
Manufacturing job losses during the expansion period have a slower decline.  In addition, the 
pace of job destruction following both troughs is more persistent in manufacturing.  In fact, job 
destruction in manufacturing remains quite high well into 2003.  Job creation trends in 
                                                 
4 Manufacturing corresponds to NAICS sectors 31 through 33, while my grouping of service, financial, and 
information industries correspond to NAICS sectors 51 through 81, excluding private households.  9  
manufacturing and in the total private sector are remarkably similar.  Both have similar job 
creation rates during the 1990-91 recession and subsequent expansion, and both exhibit a steep 
and persistent decline in job creation between 2001 and 2003.  Note, though, that job creation 





















































































































































































Notes: Estimates are based on author’s calculations from the BED data of the BLS.  See text for details. 
 
  Figure 5 shows that job flows in information, financial, and service industries (which 
average three times as many workers as manufacturing) are nearly identical to those for the total 
private sector, in both trends and magnitude.  The 1991 peak in job destruction is notably lower 
for these industries.  In addition, the pace of job creation during the expansion period, particularly 
from 1997 through 2000, is considerably higher.  Other notable trends, however, such as the 
steep, persistent drop in job creation between 2000 and 2003, occur in these industries just as they 
do in the total private sector.  10 
Figure 5. 















































































































































































Notes: Estimates are based on author’s calculations from the BED data of the BLS.  See text for details. 
 
 
Some Structural Factors and Job Flows 
  Some argue that structural change may account for the recent lack of growth in the labor 
market.  For example, Groshen and Potter (2003) argue that an acceleration of these structural 
changes may account for the current lack of growth.  They study the employment growth rates of 
all major industries during the recession and recovery periods of the past several economic 
downturns.  They group industries by whether they went through a cyclical or structural change in 
each downturn.  Cyclically changing industries are those with employment changes that generally 
follow the business cycle, while structurally changing industries are those with more permanent 
changes (i.e., relative gains or losses that persist through both the recession and recovery).  They 
find that 79 percent of employment falls into the “structural” category during the 2001-03 period, 
compared to 57 percent in the 1990-92 period and 51percent in the two preceding downturns, 
implying that structural employment reallocation across industries plays an important role in the 
recent downturn.  Indeed, in replicating the analysis of Groshen and Potter with three-digit  11 
NAICS industries, I find that 74 percent of employment falls into the “structural” category during 
2001-03, compared with 68 percent during the 1990-92 period.   
  There has also been popular speculation that the current lack of job growth is the result of 
the permanent reallocation of jobs overseas.  The reallocation may stem from either the 
contraction or closing of firms unable to compete with their foreign counterparts.
5 
  Hampering the debate over these hypotheses is a lack of appropriate data with which to 
test them.  The U.S. labor market is dynamic, reallocating about 15 percent of jobs each quarter—
analyses of the net changes in industry employment fail to capture these dynamics.  In addition, 
even with data such as the BED it is difficult to identify the portion of reallocation attributable to 
permanent changes in the economy, whether they are across industries or across borders.  While 
data on job flows cannot provide definitive answers on these topics, they can illustrate whether 
the underlying dynamics, both within and across industries, are consistent with these arguments.   
  Below, I analyze whether the growth and job flows of particular industries have 
differential responses to the recent business cycle.  I first compare industries with the greatest 
growth over the 1990’s to those with the least growth.  Using the same analysis, I then compare 
the job flows of manufacturing industries with differing levels of trade exposure.  For each 
analysis, I present the net employment growth rates and job flows independent of business cycle 
trends, using a linear de-trending.
6  Trend net growth estimates are thus the growth rate of 
industry i at time t, Nit, less the private-sector growth rate at time t, Nt.  For job flows, it is slightly 
more complex, since a) there are large persistent differences in industry-level job flows,
7 and b) 
job flow trends contain information about the long-run growth of an industry.  The former point 
implies that a simple differencing of estimates will provide a poor measure of trend job flow 
                                                 
5 Klein, Schuh, and Triest (2003) discuss the effects of international competition on manufacturing as well, 
though their most recent data is only through 1994. 
6 I use a linear de-trending since most cyclical movements occur at the endpoints of my sample period.  
Nonlinear filters, such as an HP filter, tend to be less efficient at time-series endpoints. 
7 For examples with other data sources, see Anderson and Meyer (1994), Foote (1998), and Burgess, Lane, 
and Stevens (2000).  12 
movements.  The latter point implies that correcting for these differences in too simple a manner 
(e.g., a difference-in-difference approach) will distort the underlying industry growth trend.  To 
account for both issues, I use the excess reallocation rate measure, which Davis, Haltiwanger, 
and Schuh (1996) define as the sum of the job creation and job destruction rates, less the absolute 
value of the net growth rate.  Excess reallocation measures the amount of turnover independent of 
growth in a particular period.  As such, it simultaneously captures the persistent differences in 
industry job reallocation while retaining industry differences in growth trends.  I take the excess 
reallocation rate for the private sector, XRt, averaged across all quarters in the sample, and divide 
it by the excess reallocation rate for the industry, XRit, also averaged across all quarters.  I use this 
ratio to normalize the industry job flow rates to the private-sector rates, which makes a linear 
differencing possible.  Formally, my trend estimates for net growth, job creation (Cit), and job 
destruction (Dit) are 
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Expanding versus Declining Industries 
  If, as Groshen and Potter (2003) suggest, the lack of job growth during the recent 
recovery stems from an accelerated pace of structural change, it should be evident in the industry-
level rates of job creation and job destruction.  My replication of Groshen and Potter’s analysis 
with the BED data is generally consistent with their suggestion, but this approach only appeals to 
industry net employment changes.  The industry gross job flows would provide stronger evidence 
either for or against their argument.  The structural reallocation of jobs from declining industries 
to expanding industries is a phenomenon that dates back several decades.  If this reallocation 
accelerated in the recent downturn then, all else equal, one should observe a relatively higher  13 
pace of job destruction among historically declining industries and a relatively higher pace of job 
creation among historically expanding industries during this period.   
  To explore this hypothesis, I separate 3-digit NAICS industries based on their 
employment growth between December 1993 and December 2000.  I define “Expanding” 
industries as those with growth at least one standard deviation greater than the private sector rate 
over this period (about 18 percent), and “Declining” industries as those with growth less than one 
standard deviation below the private sector rate.  By this definition, there are 11 expanding 3-digit 
industries, which notably include, internet publishing and services, telecommunications, and 
professional and administrative services.  There are also 16 declining industries, which primarily 
include manufacturing plants in the food, textile, apparel, paper, printing, chemicals, and primary 
metal industries.
8  I list all industries in Table A.2 of the appendix.  Table 2 shows the 
employment trends of each group.  There are stark differences in growth between the two groups 
during the expansion, but both groups lost jobs (albeit at different rates) through the business 
cycle trough and through the end of the sample period. 
 
Table 2. Growth in Expanding and Declining Industries 
Employment (in thousands) 
Group  Dec. 1993  Dec. 2000  Dec. 2001  June 2003 
16,461 24,253  23,098  22,604  Expanding Industries 
Change:  7,792 -1,155 -498 
7,662 6,904  6,485  6,171  Declining Industries 
Change:  -758 -419 -314 
Notes: Estimates are based on author’s calculations from the BED data of the BLS.  See appendix for 
details of industry groupings. 
 
 
  The trend growth and job flow patterns for expanding industries are in Figure 6a and the 
patterns for declining industries are in Figure 6b.  Expanding industries (by definition) gain a 
disproportionate share of jobs during the expansion, though they also lose a disproportionate 
                                                 
8 There are also six resource and mining industries that meet the criteria for a declining industry, but are 
excluded.  They make up a very small share of employment, but their trend job flows are large and volatile 
enough to make an analysis with them included difficult to interpret.  14 
share of jobs during the two recessions.  Declining industries (by definition) lose a 
disproportionate share of jobs during the expansion, but their recession-period losses are much 
closer to the national trend, producing a somewhat countercyclical trend growth pattern. 
  Job creation in expanding industries is above average (as represented by the “0” line), 
relative to the business cycle.  This is true almost throughout the entire period, with an exception 
during the 1990-91 recession, when it is roughly similar to the national trend.  Job destruction 
follows the national trend very closely from 1990 through the end of 2000.  Job losses then rise 
well above the national trend and persist at this level through mid-2003.  Within declining 
industries, both job creation and destruction are well above the national trend throughout the early 
1990’s.  Their trends, however, decline through 2000.  By 1995, job creation falls below the 
national trend.  The pace continues to decline and does not stabilize until early 2000.  Afterward, 
the trend is constant but still well below the national trend.  The pace of job destruction declines 
but remains high through 2000, at which time it stabilizes at a rate comparable with the national 
trend.  There is a slight dip in trend job destruction in 2002, but overall, job losses in these 
industries follow the national trend from 2001 through 2003. 
  Taken together, the evidence does not support the argument that job losses in the recent 
downturn are the result of an accelerated pace of between-industry reallocation.  While there does 
seem to be some structural adjustment within the declining industries, their reallocation trends 
actually decline over time.  In addition, the period in question is the time of the least turbulence 
(relative to the national trend) for these industries.  If there exist any structural shifts between 
2001 and 2003, they occur among the industries that grew the most over the 1990’s.  These 
industries have a sharp increase in trend job destruction that persists through these years.  
Regardless, trend job creation remains above the national rate at a proportion similar to that of the 
preceding expansion period.  Thus, my job flow findings are consistent with the work of Groshen 
and Potter on two of three counts.  Most importantly, the evidence from this and previous sections 
suggests that the latest prolonged downturn in the labor market is unique, and quite different from  15 
the 1990-92 downturn.  The evidence also suggests that patterns of between-industry structural 
change are prevalent throughout the sample period.  The evidence does not suggest, however, that 
an accelerated pace of this structural change substantially contributed to the recent lack of job 
growth. 
Manufacturing Job Flows and Trade Exposure 
  There is some speculation that industries that face strong international competition were 
more susceptible to permanent job losses during the recent downturn.  As these industries recover 
from an adverse aggregate shock, increased competition may reallocate lost jobs to countries with 
lower labor costs.  If this hypothesis were true, all else equal, one should observe high rates of job 
destruction and low rates of job creation among the industries most sensitive to trade during the 
recent downturn.  Industries that either gain from trade (through exports) or are independent of 
trade should be relatively unaffected. 
Figure 6a. 
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Figure 6b. 


















































































































































































Notes: Estimates are based on author’s calculations from the BED data of the BLS.  See text for details. 
 
  To test the trade hypothesis, I group manufacturing industries by their level of trade 
exposure.  I use data on imports (I), exports (X), and the value of shipments (Q) compiled by the 
U.S. International Trade Administration.  These data primarily use the Annual Survey of 
Manufactures of the U.S. Census Bureau and are readily available for 3-digit NAICS sector 
annually for 1997 through 2001.  I group the industries into four categories.  “Trade Sensitive” 
industries are industries that have relatively high imports and low exports.  These industries 
include textile product and apparel makers, wood and furniture makers, and primary metals 
industries.  “Trade Gaining” industries are those with high exports and relatively low imports, and 
include chemicals, plastics, and machinery.  “High-Volume Trade” industries are those that are 
very open to trade and have high exports and imports.  They include computers, electrical 
equipment, and transportation equipment.  Finally, “Trade-Independent” industries are those that 
have low imports and exports.  They include food and beverage manufacturing, paper and 
printing, and fabricated metals manufacturing.  In Table 3, I report the 1997 estimates of each  17 
group’s import penetration ratio, export share, and index of trade-openness.
9  The import 
penetration ratio  () () X I Q I − + is the ratio of imports to domestic consumption, where 
consumption is defined as shipments plus imports less exports.  The export share is the ratio of 
exports to shipments () Q X / .  Finally, the measure of trade-openness is the sum of exports and 
imports as a share of the sum of shipments and imports  () () () I Q X I + + .  The trade sensitive 
industries are the smallest of the three groups, in terms of value of shipments.  These industries, 
along with high-volume trading industries, have the highest import penetration ratios.  High-
volume trading industries have the highest export shares (followed by trade-gaining industries), 
and consequently have the greatest openness to trade.  Trade-independent industries have 
considerably lower trade measures relative to the other three groups. 
 





(Q, $ billion) 
Import 
Penetration 






[(I + X)/(Q + I)] 
Trade Sensitive     530.6  0.266  0.107  0.325 
High-Volume Trade  1,126.8 0.289  0.237  0.417 
Trade Gainers     904.2  0.156  0.184  0.291 
Trade Independent  1,273.2 0.072  0.066  0.129 
All Manufacturing  3,834.7 0.187  0.149  0.289 
Notes: Estimates based on author’s calculations from industry data by the U.S. International Trade 
Administration.  See appendix for details of industry groupings. 
 
 
  Figures 7a through 7d present the trend growth and job flow rates for each group.  Figure 
7a presents the evidence for trade-sensitive industries.  As one might expect, job growth in these 
industries have been well below the national trend.  This is especially true during the two 
recessions and in the years immediately preceding and following the 2001 recession.  These 
losses occur primarily through high rates of trend job destruction that persist through 2003.  Job 
creation is somewhat above the national trend early in the sample period and somewhat below the 
                                                 
9 There is an increasing level of trade between 1997 and 2001, but the ordinal rankings of industries’ trade 
measures are essentially constant across the years.  Thus, I only report the 1997 estimates.  18 
trend later on, but the differences are small in comparison to the behavior of job destruction.  By 
itself, this evidence suggests that trade liberalization indeed adversely affects the most sensitive 
industries: they destroy jobs at a rate well above the national trend, and it is exacerbated during 
the recent recession and subsequent stagnant recovery.  
  The evidence in Figures 7b and 7c, however, casts serious doubt on this claim.  In these 
figures, which present the evidence for trade-gaining and high-volume trading industries, 
respectively, trend job losses (both net and gross) are much greater between 2001 and 2003 
relative to the losses in trade sensitive industries.  The major differences occur during the 
expansion period where, between 1994 and 1998, trade-gaining and high-volume trading 
industries destroyed jobs near the national rate, while trade-sensitive industries destroyed jobs 
above that rate.  The only divergent trends are among industries with low imports and exports 
(Figure 7d).  These industries have relatively high trend rates of both job creation and destruction 
at the beginning of the period, but they exhibit a steady decline that eventually stabilizes.  If 
anything, the patterns mimic those of the declining industries in Figure 6b.  This is no surprise, 
however, since four of the seven trade-independent industries are also in the earlier-defined 
declining group.  19 
Figure 7a. 
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Figure 7c. 


































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Estimates are based on author’s calculations from the BED data of the BLS.  See text for details. 
  21 
The Recent Decrease in Job Creation 
  The above evidence on job flows shows that the last two recessions and their subsequent 
recovery periods are quite different.  Job destruction spikes and then declines during the 1990-92 
downturn, while job creation is relatively unchanged.  Job destruction spikes and then declines 
during the 2001-03 downturn, but job creation decreases and persists at a dramatically low rate 
through the end of the sample period.  Which of these two outcomes is closer to the historical 
norm?  Evidence from previous research suggests that the 2001-03 downturn is unlike other 
recessions.  Job flow data for the entire private sector is not available pre-1990, but Davis, 
Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) have job flow estimates for manufacturing for 1972 through 1993 
based on the Census Bureau’s Census of Manufactures and Annual Survey of Manufactures.
10  I 
overlay these estimates with my manufacturing estimates in Figure 8.  The data are relatively 
comparable, with two caveats.  First, most of the Census estimates are based on smaller samples, 
and thus estimates are somewhat more volatile.  Second, the sample nature of the Census data 
makes it easier to track continuing plants, which reduces the potential for overstatement of job 
flows, so their average estimates may be somewhat lower.  One can see the effects of these 
differences where the two series overlap between 1990 and 1993.  With these caveats in mind, it 
is evident how starkly different the behavior of job creation is from 2000 through 2003 when 
compared to earlier years.  There are other periods where a decrease in job creation is at least as 
dramatic, but no other time when it is as persistent.  Conversely, the behavior of job destruction is 
comparable to earlier years.  In fact, the large spikes in job destruction in 1991 and 2001 are small 
compared to the sharp losses in 1975, 1980, and 1982.  Foote (1998) argues that manufacturing is 
different than other industries, but his argument is directed towards its patterns of job destruction.  
Both job destruction and job creation patterns in manufacturing, though, are strikingly similar in 
behavior to the information, finance, and service industries (see Figures 4 and 5).  While the 
                                                 
10 I thank John Haltiwanger for providing these estimates.  They are publicly available at 
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/econ/haltiwanger/download.htm. 
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evidence is not definitive, it strongly suggests that the large, persistent decrease in job creation 
makes the most recent economic downturn unlike any other in the past 30 years. 
  What caused such a drastic and unique downturn?  This remains an open question, but the 
behavior of business investment and its relation to gross job creation provides some clues.  Real 
investment in equipment and software falls 8.4 percent during the 2001 recession and remains 5.0 
percent below its peak value through the third quarter of 1992.
11  Similarly, the pace of job 
creation falls 7.4 percent during the recession and is 12.1 percent below its peak value by the 
second quarter of 2003.  Between 1990 and 1992, investment falls only 3.4 percent during the 
recession and is 6.0 percent higher than its peak value by the third quarter of 1992.  Job creation 
changes little in either the recession or recovery periods, indicating that both investment and job 
creation have similar trends in both downturns. 
Figure 8. 















































































































































































































Notes: Estimates are based on author’s calculations from the BED data of the BLS and Longitudinal 
Research Database of the Census Bureau.  See text for details. 
 
                                                 
11 Percentages are based on National Income Product Account estimates from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis.  23 
  Figure 9 illustrates the movement of job creation and business investment between 1990 
and 2003.  It shows the quarterly levels of job creation and job destruction (both in thousands of 
employees) compared to investment in equipment and software (in billions of chained 2000 
dollars).
12  The patterns of job creation and investment are very similar throughout the period.  
Evident in the figure are the relatively flat patterns of job creation and investment between 1990 
and 1992 and the substantial declines in both series between 2001 and 2003.  Job creation and 
investment also track each other well during the expansion period, with both series increasing 
considerably.  Consequently, the Pearson correlation between the two series is a robust 0.78 over.  
Job destruction and investment also track each other closely, but do so primarily during the 
expansion.  Job destruction and investment generally move in opposite directions during the two 
recessions.   
Figure 9. 



































































































Gross Jobs Created (Left axis)
Gross Jobs Destroyed (Left axis)
Investment (Right axis)
 
Notes: Estimates are based on author’s calculations from the BED data of the BLS and the National 
Income Product Accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  See text for details. 
 
  This evidence suggests an important relation between gross job creation and business 
investment.  As with job creation, evidence from previous business cycles suggests that the recent 
                                                 
12 I show estimates in levels rather than rates since comparable data on the appropriate denominator for 
investment (the total stock of capital) is not readily available.  24 
decline in business investment runs counter to its historical trends.  Eighteen months into the 
recoveries of the previous seven recessions, real gross private investment is an average of 10.0 
percent higher than its peak level.  Eighteen months into the current recovery, real gross private 
investment is 4.9 percent lower than its peak level.
13 An economic relation between investment 
and job creation is easy to perceive, since the former is a gross flow of capital inputs and the latter 
a gross flow of labor inputs.  It is also conceivable that the relation between job destruction and 
investment would be weaker, since labor is less costly to adjust (and hence more responsive to 
aggregate shocks) than capital.  Whether a labor market downturn stems from high job 
destruction or low job creation may depend on whether a macroeconomic shock propagates 
through aggregate demand or investment.  Further research can identify whether the nature of a 
shock or other factors determine these relations. 
 
Conclusions 
  Between 1990 and 1992, the U.S. private sector has a dramatic spike in job destruction 
with job losses slow to decline until the latter half of 1992.  Throughout this period, creation 
changes little.  This leads to a net loss of 1.9 million jobs during the recession and a gain of only 
103,000 jobs over the following 18 months.  There are also large job losses between 2001 and 
2003.  The private sector loses 2.7 million jobs during the recession and an additional 1.1 million 
over the following 18 months.  This time, however, after a spike during the recession, the pace of 
job destruction quickly returns to its pre-recession pace.  The large, persistent job losses instead 
stem from a dramatic decline in job creation.  This decline begins a year before the business cycle 
peak and continues (with a brief revival in early 2002) through mid-2003. 
  Groshen and Potter (2003) suggest that an accelerated pace of structural change may have 
led to the most recent period of prolonged job loss.  My findings suggest that patterns of 
                                                 
13 Note that these statistics are for gross private investment, of which investment in equipment and software 
is a component.  The latter statistic is not available in real dollars prior to 1990.    25 
structural change are indeed prevalent dating back to 1990.  Declining industries lose jobs 
throughout the period, and do so with a job destruction rate well above the national trend.  
Expanding industries gain jobs throughout, though their net gains are more responsive to the 
business cycle.  Expanding industries have an above-average rate of job creation beginning in 
1991 and continuing through 2003.  Trend job destruction generally follows national patterns, 
though it increases in 2000.  Nevertheless, the evidence does not support the hypothesis that these 
trends accelerated during the recent downturn.  Between 2000 and 2003, job destruction in 
declining industries generally follows the national trend.  Trend job creation begins low and 
remains so throughout.  Neither job flow deviates from its pattern during this time, however.  In 
other words, within traditionally declining industries, neither trend job creation nor trend job 
destruction change during the recent slowdown, implying that an accelerated pace of structural 
change is likely not the cause of the observed jobless spell.  The same is true of trend job creation 
in the expanding industries.  Trend job destruction does increase for expanding industries during 
this time.  This is inconsistent with a structural change hypothesis, but it does create an empirical 
puzzle.  It may be reflective of an employment bubble bursting, though there is no comparable 
increase in trend job creation that precedes it.  Given their large losses, manufacturing has 
received most of the attention during the recent downturn.  This evidence suggests that further 
research on traditionally expanding industries is warranted as well. 
  Another hypothesis suggests that changing trade patterns have made certain industries 
more susceptible to international competition during slowdowns and increases the reallocation of 
jobs overseas.  The massive losses in manufacturing (i.e., the sector most affected by international 
trade) lend credence to this reasoning.  Between 2000 and 2003, however, I find that 
manufacturing industries most sensitive to international competition fare no worse than the 
manufacturing industries that gain from trade.  The losses in manufacturing may be more 
reflective of a slowdown in global aggregate demand.  According to estimates from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, the real value of exports falls 10.4 percent between the first and fourth  26 
quarters of 2001, and exports are still 8.4 percent lower than their first quarter, 2001 levels by 
mid-2003.  These decreases are well below the historical business cycle norms, suggesting that 
the flagging levels of exports may directly contribute to the sharp job losses in manufacturing. 
  Finally, job flow evidence from other data sources suggest that the recent decline in the 
pace job creation has no precedent in at least 30 years.  The drop in job creation parallels a 
similarly unusual drop in business investment, and the patterns of both gross job creation and 
investment in equipment and software track each other closely between 1990 and 2003.  
Conversely, gross job destruction and investment only move together during the expansion 
period, and generally move in opposite directions during each recession.  Whether low job 
creation or high job destruction dominates during a recession may depend on the relative impacts 
of shocks to investment versus shocks to aggregate demand.  One must also consider other factors 
outside the labor market.  Between 2000 and 2003, the U.S. experienced a rapid decline in stock 
market values, the September 11 terrorist attacks, corporate accounting scandals, and geopolitical 
uncertainties resulting from the war in Iraq.  These events may have had a direct effect on job 
creation via increased uncertainty that reduced the incentive to hire, or an indirect effect via 
reductions in the incentive to invest in new capital.  Further research will enhance our 
understanding of the job losses over the last two downturns, and the evidence I present in this 
paper will no doubt aid in guiding this research. 
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Appendix 
  Implementation of the “Multiple Worksite Report” (MWR) in the early 1990’s caused 
serious complications to the LDB linkage process.  The MWR was implemented so that multi-
establishment firms could easily report the employment and payroll of their separate 
establishments.  Prior to the MWR, many firms reported their multiple establishments as a single 
UI record.  Consequently, the MWR implementation caused a widespread restructuring of the UI 
establishment records of many large firms.  This restructuring generally involved the breaking out 
of a single UI record into multiple establishment records.  The UI account number remained the 
same during these changes, but the reporting unit numbers (by which the BED links 
establishment records) did not.  In addition, predecessor and successor unit information (which 
the BED linkage process uses to identify routine administrative changes) was often not reported 
for the MWR implementation.  As a result, the linkage process failed to identify these changes 
and instead counted the MWR implementations as employment changes due to closing and 
opening establishments.  This created large job flow overstatements in 1991/1 and 1992/2, and a 
minor overstatement in 1993/1. 
  To correct for these overstatements, I appeal to the characteristics of the MWR 
implementation to create a linkage strategy.  First, I note that MWR implementation occurs at the 
state level.  Most states introduced the MWR in the first quarter of 1991, while Ohio did so in two 
stages, in the second quarter of 1992 and the third quarter of 1993.
14  Some states already had a 
similar report in place, and so did not have to restructure their accounts.  Other states also 
included predecessor and successor record information, allowing a successful linkage with the 
LDB algorithm.  Thus, I only have to focus on a subset of states, minimizing my chances of 
making a false match.  Second, UI account numbers should not change in a MWR 
implementation.  This is not necessarily true of other administrative changes.  Third, since these 
                                                 
14 Further analysis showed that a single, very large multi-state firm had a similar account restructuring in 
the first quarter of 1992.  I deal with its restructuring in a similar manner to the MWR changes, but do not 
report the results of this match for confidentiality reasons.  29 
changes are theoretically only changes in paperwork, there should be no movement of 
employment across industries or locations, which sometimes occurs in the data during corporate 
mergers and other account restructurings.  Finally, the UI data have a fine level of geographic and 
industry detail (county level, and either 4-digit SIC or 6-digit NAICS, respectively).  Large 
employment fluctuations at these levels of detail are relatively rare and thus easily identifiable in 
the data.   
  Given these characteristics, I use a three-step process.  The first step calculates job flows 
using the standard BED methodology.  From this, I take the subset of establishments classified as 
openings or closings.  By only looking at this subset, I tacitly assume that MWR restructurings 
cannot be part of other administrative changes, which I find to be entirely plausible.  The second 
step identifies within-state linkages by UI account number, county, and detailed industry.  When 
doing so, I make every effort to ensure that records are correctly linked to each other within these 
match cells.  The final step recognizes that, in practice, some new records will have different 
industry codes than their predecessor.  To account for this, the final pass takes the remaining 
unlinked records and attempts to match by UI account number and county.  In general, this step 
produces less than 10 percent of the total matches I identify.   
  My approach is not without risks.  First, there exists the possibility of producing false 
matches of truly opening and closing establishments.  I am not too concerned with this possibility 
since the false match would have to occur among opening and closing establishments within both 
the same firm and the same county, an occurrence that is generally rare, especially among larger 
establishments (which are disproportionately represented among the potentially affected UI 
records).  Second, there exists the possibility that I miss links that occur either within UI accounts 
and across counties or across entirely different UI accounts.  Since I have no predecessor or 
successor record information, I cannot identify these matches without increasing the chances of a 
false match among other records.  Thus, missed linkages potentially remain after my 
identification.  While this may seem troublesome, administrative changes of this nature are  30 
inconsistent with the implementation procedures of the MWR, so I am confident in my final 
estimates.   
  Table A.1 lists the number of matches made by and the effects of my identification 
strategy in the three quarters of interest.  Note that the matches should significantly reduce 
employment changes at opening and closing establishments.  Matches will also slightly increase 
employment changes at continuing establishments, since newly-matched records often have 
legitimate changes in employment during these quarters.  Note that matches in the first quarter of 
1991 occur across most of the U.S., while matches in the second quarter of 1992 and first quarter 
of 1993 are only in Ohio.  Overall, my final job flow estimates in the problem quarters are 
comparable to those in other quarters. 
 
Table A.1. Results of Match Identification for Potential MWR Issues 
  Initial Estimate  Corrected Estimate 








First  Quarter,  1991      
     Changes at Openings  5,321  6.0  2,270  2.5 
     Changes at Closings  5,462  6.1  2,103  2.4 
     Changes at Expansions  4,402  4.9  4,685  5.3 
     Changes at Contractions  7,784  8.7  8,376  9.4 
Second  Quarter,  1992      
     Changes at Openings  3,156  3.6  1,887  2.1 
     Changes at Closings  2,481  2.8  1,226  1.4 
     Changes at Expansions  6,642  7.5  6,747  7.6 
     Changes at Contractions  4,310  4.9  4,401  5.0 
First Quarter, 1993         
     Changes at Openings  2,111  2.4  1,835  2.1 
     Changes at Closings  2,171  2.4  1,871  2.1 
     Changes at Expansions  4,706  5.3  4,752  5.3 
     Changes at Contractions  6,319  7.1  6,388  7.1 
Note: Listed employment changes are prior to seasonal adjustment.  31 
 
Table A.2.  NAICS Industries In Each Category 
Expanding Industries (NAICS)  Declining Industries (NAICS) 
Specialty Trade Contractors (238) 
Electronics & Appliance Stores (443) 
Rail Transportation (482)* 
Support for Transportation (488) 
Internet Publishing (516) 
Telecommunications (517) 
Internet Services & Data Processing (518) 
Financial Investment Services (523) 
Professional, Scientific, & Technical Services (541) 
Administrative & Support Services (561) 
Amusement & Recreation (713) 
 
Foods (311) 
Textile Mills (313) 
Textile Product Mills (314) 
Apparel (315) 
Leather & Allied Products (316) 
Paper (322) 
Printing (323) 
Petroleum & Gas Products (324) 
Chemicals (325) 
Primary Metals (331) 
Wholesale Electronic Markets (425) 
Water Transportation (483) 
Pipeline Transportation (486) 
Postal Service [private employment] (491)* 
Central Bank Monetary Authorities (521)* 
Performing Arts, Sports, & Related Industries (711) 
Trade Gaining Industries (NAICS)  High-Volume Trade (NAICS) 
Textile Mills (313) 
Chemicals (325) 
Plastics & Rubber Products (326) 
Machinery (333) 
Computers & Electronics (334) 
Electrical Equipment (335) 
Transportation Equipment (336) 
Trade Sensitive Industries (NAICS)  Trade-Independent Industries (NAICS) 
Textile Product Mills (314) 
Apparel (315) 
Leather & Allied Products (316) 
Wood Products (321) 
Primary Metals (331) 
Furniture (337) 
Misc. Manufacturing (339) 
Foods (311) 
Beverages & Tobacco (312) 
Paper (322) 
Printing (323) 
Petroleum & Gas Products (324) 
Nonmetallic Minerals (327) 
Fabricated Metals (332) 
* Private employment in these industries is very small, averaging less than 25,000. 